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I. INTRODUCTION
There can be a certain politeness to legal challenges to "Don't Ask,
Don't Tell," the congressional policy that attempts - fitfully,
incompletely, and arbitrarily - to exclude gay citizens from both the
responsibilities and privileges of military service.' We consider whether
the military has articulated a "rational basis" for the policy - some
explanation of the military's belief that it is at least rational (as opposed
to irrational) to classify servicemembers as straight or gay and accept or
reject them accordingly, all in the interest of military effectiveness. We
accept the fact that judges assume there is a need for "deference" to
* Research Foundation Professor of Law, University of Florida Levin College of Law.
Aircraft and munitions maintenance officer, U.S. Air Force, 1979-83.
1. See 10 U.S.C. § 654 (2004) ("Policy concerning homosexuality in the armed forces").
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military or congressional expertise in the serious business of raising and
preparing military forces to fight and win wars. We speak about "Don't
Ask, Don't Tell," unfortunately, as if its justifications reflected informed
and thoughtful judgment, as if they were honest and truthful, and as if they
were offered in good faith for the purpose of maintaining military
readiness.
The justifications advanced in defense of "Don't Ask, Don't Tell,"
however, fail to meet any of these reasonable and minimal expectations.
The judgments underlying the policy are not military judgments, and
neither are they informed, thoughtful, honest, truthful, or made in good
faith. The policy, in fact, has absolutely nothing to do with military
readiness. Indeed, its effect is one that is fundamentally harmful to military
readiness, to national security, to our servicemembers and veterans, to
values of constitutional equality, and to robust civilian control of the
military under the Constitution. Impolite observations such as these, rare
as they may be, are a necessary and constitutionally healthy exercise in
examining why our civil-military relations have deteriorated and why
policies such as "Don't Ask, Don't Tell" persist.
The recent U.S. Supreme Court decision, Lawrence v. Texas,2 provides
an occasion for reassessment of the constitutionality of "Don't Ask, Don't
Tell." In Lawrence, the Court held that substantive guarantees of liberty
found in the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the U.S.
Constitution include the right to engage in consensual sexual intimacy
without interference from the government. The Court invalidated a Texas
criminal statute that prohibited certain sexual conduct, often broadly
referred to as "sodomy," if engaged in by persons of the same sex, but not
if engaged in by persons of the opposite sex.4 In invalidating the statute,
the Court also expressly overruled Bowers v. Hardwick,5 a decision that
affirmed a criminal sodomy conviction and established a foundation for a
wide variety of legal disabilities imposed against gay people as individuals
and as partners in same-sex relationships.6
2. 123 S. Ct. 2472 (2003).
3. Id. at 2484.
4. Id. at 2476.
5. 478 U.S. 186 (1986).
6. Lawrence, 123 S. Ct. at 2484.
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II. Is LAWRENCE V. TEXAS RELEVANT TO "DON'T ASK, DON'T TELL"?
The majority opinion in Lawrence did not specifically mention the
military at all. The closest the Court came to saying anything that might
be construed as a potential reference to the military was its statement that
the government generally steps beyond constitutional limits when it
attempts to "define the meaning of [a personal] relationship or to set its
boundaries absent injury to a person or abuse of an institution the law
protects."7 Someone, I suppose, might argue the Court was suggesting that
same-sex relationships could be regulated if they were found to "abuse"
the military, which presumably is an institution (like schools, hospitals, or
banks, for example) that the law in some sense "protects." In the context
of the opinion, however, such an interpretation makes little sense. It seems
more likely that the Court was referring to institutions that are specifically
defined by the existence of personal relationships, such as the institutions
of marriage, family, and kinship.
Justice O'Connor' s concurrence' and Justice Scalia's dissent mentioned
national security or military concerns,9 but only in a passing fashion.
Neither Justice directly addressed whether Lawrence would invalidate
military policies regulating sexual behavior or affect the eligibility of gay
people to serve in the military. Justice O'Connor observed, vaguely, that
"Texas cannot assert any legitimate state interest here, such as national
security."' ° She left unexplained, however, what circumstances might
trigger national security concerns. Justice Scalia's dissent cited "Don't
Ask, Don't Tell" for the proposition that if direct, facial discrimination on
the basis of sexual orientation was permissible, then the indirect
discriminatory effects that result from the existence of sodomy statutes
could not possibly raise constitutional concern.' He also objected to the
overruling of Bowers, claiming that society has a vested interest in its
ability to express moral disapproval by imposing legal disabilities on gay
people. Justice Scalia offered "Don't Ask, Don't Tell" as but one example
of societal reliance on the principles of Bowers.12
7. Id. at 2478 (emphasis added).
8. Id. at 2488 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
9. Id. at 2490 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
10. Id. at 2487-88 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
11. See Lawrence, 123 S. Ct. at 2497 (Scalia, J., dissenting) ("(I]n most States what the Court
calls 'discrimination' against those who engage in homosexual acts is perfectly legal... []n some
cases such 'discrimination' is mandated by federal statute.").
12. See id. at 2490 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (asserting that "' societal reliance' on the principles
confirmed in Bowers and discarded today has been overwhelming").
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The fact that Lawrence failed to say much about the military does not
mean the opinion has little significance for the constitutionality of the
"Don't Ask, Don't Tell" policy. Neither does the fact that Lawrence
addressed a narrow issue concerning the criminal prosecution of sodomy
mean that it lacks relevance for the much broader issue of the eligibility of
gay citizens for military service. In fact, the opinion holds great
significance for that question, for three reasons. First, Lawrence has
relevance for the continued vitality of "Don't Ask, Don't Tell" because it
spoke in a fundamental sense of people and, as the military is so fond of
saying, the military runs not on its equipment, but on its people. Shortly
after September 11, 2001, the Army Chief of Staff, General Eric Shinseki,
explained:
People are central to everything else we do in the Army. Institutions
don't transform, people do. Platforms and organizations don't
defend this nation, people do. And finally, units don't train, they
don't stay ready, they don't grow and develop leadership, they
don't sacrifice, and they don't take risks on behalf of the nation,
people do.'3
Lawrence defined those same people in terms of their dignity, in terms
of the importance of their private lives, and in terms of their enduring
personal bonds with others:
It suffices for us to acknowledge that adults may choose to enter
upon this relationship in the confines of their homes and their own
private lives and still retain their dignity as free persons. When
sexuality finds overt expression in intimate conduct with another
person, the conduct can be but one element in a personal bond that
is more enduring. The liberty protected by the Constitution allows
homosexual persons the right to make this choice. 4
These are the same people from whom the military must draw its
members, and the same people on whom the military must rely to carry out
its missions effectively. It will be for the military to explain why only
some of its members - the heterosexual ones - retain a claim to dignity,
to a private life, and to an enduring personal bond.
13. General Frederick M. Franks, Jr., U.S. Army Retired, Foreword to THE FUTURE OF THE
ARMY PROFESSION, at xi-xii (Don M. Snider & Gayle L. Watkins eds., 2002).
14. Lawrence, 123 S. Ct. at 2478.
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Second, Lawrence made clear that there are limits to the reach of
governmental intrusion into matters of personal intimacy. Absent
sufficient justification, the power of government cannot be used to coerce
the decisions of individuals with respect to this central component of
personal autonomy. "Their right to liberty under the Due Process Clause
gives them the full right to engage in their conduct without intervention of
the government. 'It is a promise of the Constitution that there is a realm of
personal liberty which the government may not enter.""' The opinion
made no categorical exception from this constitutional command for the
military, or for any other function of government. This lack of categorical
exception was sensible, even necessary, given the basis for the Court's
ruling. To conclude otherwise would be to hold that there are some
stations within our society, or some responsibilities of citizenship, that are
fundamentally inconsistent with constitutionally protected dignity, the
existence of private life, and the enjoyment of enduring personal bonds.
Only if that fundamental inconsistency exists should the government be
permitted to intrude upon those decisions reserved to the liberty of
individuals by the Due Process Clause, and Lawrence gave no indication
that such an all-encompassing government interest exists, military or
otherwise.
Third, and most significantly, Lawrence expressly held that the
maintenance of a shared moral code is not, in and of itself, a legitimate
government interest. This is an extraordinarily powerful statement because
it extends far beyond the suggestion that maintenance of a shared moral
code is an interest that is less important than the liberty interest of an
individual; instead, the Court held that the maintenance of a shared moral
code is not even a legitimate activity of government. Under Lawrence, it
is simply not within the power of government to make distinctions among
groups of persons for the purpose of enforcing majority conceptions of
"moral" and "immoral" choices within the realm of private intimacy,
absent articulation of an independent harm that is within the government's
power to control. In the Court's words, "the fact that the governing
majority in a State has traditionally viewed a particular practice as
immoral is not a sufficient reason for upholding a law prohibiting the
practice."' 6 Justice O'Connor added, in a concurring opinion, her belief
that the Court has "never held that moral disapproval, without any other
asserted state interest, is a sufficient rationale under the Equal Protection
15. Id. at 2484 (quoting Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833,847
(1992)).
16. Id. at 2483 (quoting Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 216 (1986) (Stevens, J.,
dissenting)).
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Clause to justify a law that discriminates among groups of persons."' 7
Lawrence now completes a trilogy of cases standing for the proposition
that moral disapproval alone cannot justify unequal treatment. 8
III. IS THE MAINTENANCE OF A SHARED MORAL CODE A LEGITIMATE
MILITARY INTEREST?
The disqualification of moral disapproval as a legitimate government
interest is relevant to the constitutional validity of "Don't Ask, Don't Tell"
because moral disapproval underlies much of the current justification for
the exclusion of gay servicemembers. I qualify the reference to the
justification as "current" because the reasons offered by the military (and
with the enactment of "Don't Ask, Don't Tell," the reasons offered by
Congress) in defense of the policy have been constantly shifting targets,
with new reasons constructed as old ones were eventually discredited.'
The principal justification underlying "Don't Ask, Don't Tell" today
seems to center on the assertion that the presence of gay servicemembers
(at least those who are known to be gay) adversely affects unit cohesion,
which leads to deterioration of military effectiveness:
Success in combat requires military units that are characterized by
high morale, good order and discipline, and unit cohesion.
One of the most critical elements in combat capability is unit
cohesion, that is, the bonds of trust among individual service
members that make the combat effectiveness of a military unit
17. Id. at 2486 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
18. See Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 635 (1996) ("We must conclude that Amendment 2
classifies homosexuals not to further a proper legislative end but to make them unequal to everyone
else."); id. at 644 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (characterizing the "animus" identified by the majority as
merely "moral disapproval of homosexual conduct, the same sort of moral disapproval that
produced the centuries-old criminal laws that we held constitutional in Bowers"); Planned
Parenthood of Southeastern Pa., 505 U.S. at 850 ("Our obligation is to define the liberty of all, not
to mandate our own moral code.").
19. See generally DON'T ASK, DON'T TELL: DEBATING THE GAY BAN IN THE MILITARY
(Aaron Belkin & Geoffrey Bateman eds., 2003) (discrediting rationales based on unit cohesion and
privacy); C. Dixon Osbum, A Policy in Desperate Search of a Rationale: The Military's Policy on
Lesbians, Gays and Bisexuals, 64 UMKC L. REV. 199 (1995) (reviewing past reasons, now
discredited and abandoned, for excluding gay citizens from military service; noting that the military
has at various times insisted that gay citizens were mentally ill, were a security risk, were unfit or
unsuitable for service, had a greater propensity for sexual misconduct, and adversely affected the
cohesion of military units).
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greater than the sum of the combat effectiveness of the individual
unit members.
The presence in the armed forces of persons who demonstrate a
propensity or intent to engage in homosexual acts would create an
unacceptable risk to the standards of morale, good order and
discipline, and unit cohesion that are the essence of military
capability.2
0
The military presumes that servicemembers will not establish cohesive
bonds with others - their gay colleagues - if they morally disapprove of
them. This concern for unit cohesion, however, is nothing more than an
insistence that the government enforce a shared moral code within the
military, a task that, under Lawrence, the government cannot generally
undertake. The difficult question for purposes of applying Lawrence to
"Don't Ask, Don't Tell" is whether the maintenance of a shared moral
code might be a legitimate military interest in a military environment, even
if the enforcement of moral views would not be a legitimate interest of
government with respect to civilian society.
The Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ) is a general criminal
code enacted by Congress pursuant to its Article I power to govern and
regulate the military.' One of its provisions, Article 134, prohibits
servicemembers from engaging in "all disorders and neglects to the
20. 10 U.S.C. § 654(a)(6), (7), (15) (2004). Congress also offered another justification, less
prominently featured, grounded in the privacy interests of heterosexual servicemembers who must
"accept living conditions and working conditions that are often spartan, primitive, and characterized
by forced intimacy with little or no privacy." Id. § 654(a)(12). This justification, more commonly
known as the shower problem, is based on a centrally flawed assumption. In our society we have
never segregated shower, toilet, and sleeping activities on the basis of sexual orientation; we are
socialized to do so on the basis of sex. Males (and females) grow up performing these activities in
the company of others of the same sex in schools, colleges, camps, locker rooms, and shared
bathrooms, without any expectation that their gay peers will be excluded. Only in the military is
there the unique expectation that these activities cannot be performed in groups of mixed sexual
orientation. See Aaron Belkin & Melissa Sheridan Embser-Herbert, A Modest Proposal: Privacy
as a Flawed Rationale for the Exclusion of Gays and Lesbians from the US. Military, 27 INT.
SECURITY 178 (2002). Moreover, combat exigencies tend to erase even established social
conventions. See Gordon Lubold, Band of Sisters: Army Lionesses Hit Streets with Marines on
Combat Ops, MARINE CORPS TIMEs, Aug. 9, 2004 (noting that women in the First Engineer
Battalion headquarters company in Iraq live in close quarters with the men in their platoons),
available at http://www.woridaffairsboard.com/showthread.php?goto--newspost&t=2641 (last
visited Aug. 10, 2004).
21. Uniform Code of Military Justice, Pub. L. No. 81-506, 64 Stat. 107 (1950) (codified as
amended at 10 U.S.C. §§ 801-947 (2004)).
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prejudice of good order and discipline in the armed forces" and "all
conduct of a nature to bring discredit upon the armed forces."22 Article
134, also known as the "General Article," is designed to enforce
"longstanding customs and usages of the services"23 by prohibiting
misconduct not otherwise specifically enumerated as a criminal offense
elsewhere within the UCMJ. The Manual for Courts-Martial describes
fifty-seven illustrative applications of the very general Article 134,
including speech offenses (disloyal statements, indecent language); duty-
related misconduct (drinking liquor with a prisoner, straggling on a march
or maneuvers); common criminal acts (negligent homicide, kidnapping);
and a host of misdeeds involving inappropriate relationships (adultery,
bigamy, fraternization, gambling with a subordinate, wrongful
cohabitation).24 What all offenses under Article 134 have in common is the
requirement that the military prove a specific element demonstrating the
misconduct was in fact 1) prejudicial to good order and discipline or 2) of
a nature to bring discredit upon the armed forces. The military cannot
simply assume or assert that offenses charged under Article 134 meet one
of these elements.25
The general article illustrates the wide latitude Congress has granted to
the military to determine when it is necessary to punish conduct criminally
in order to preserve and maintain good order and discipline. Congress
certainly intended to tap this same reservoir of discretion when it grounded
the administrative sanctions of "Don't Ask, Don't Tell" in terms of the
military's fundamental need for good order and discipline. Good order and
discipline are the most basic currency of military effectiveness, and it was
the intent of Congress to justify the exclusion of gay servicemembers in
a manner that relied upon expertise presumably only the military could
provide, protecting the policy from further scrutiny by civilians. Congress,
however, received a great deal of assistance in that venture from what was
perhaps a counterintuitive source, the federal courts. The judicial branch
was complicit in ensuring that "Don't Ask, Don't Tell" was a decision
made solely on the basis of purported military judgment, not constitutional
judgment.
22. 10 U.S.C. § 934 (2004).
23. Parker v. Levy, 417 U.S. 733, 746-47 (1974). Parker v. Levy also upheld the
constitutionality of Article 134 against a challenge that it was vague and overbroad in violation of
the First and Fifth Amendments. See id. at 752-62.
24. MANUAL FOR COURTS-MARTAL, UNrrED STATES pt. IV, In 60-113 (2002).
25. Id. 60b.
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IV. WHAT IS THE BASIS FOR THE DOCTRINE OF JUDICIAL DEFERENCE TO
THE MILITARY?
In a series of cases decided after the end of the Vietnam-era military
draft, the Supreme Court constructed a doctrine of constitutional
separatism that shields military-related decisions from the usual scrutiny
ofjudicial review. In Parker v. Levy,26 the Court upheld the conviction by
court-martial of an Army physician who had refused an order to conduct
dermatology training for Special Forces personnel and had also
encouraged enlisted personnel to resist combat duty in Vietnam. The
opinion would have been unremarkable had it relied on the military's
discretionary authority to control breaches of internal discipline, a
category which certainly would have included Captain Levy's failure to
obey orders and his promotion of disloyalty among subordinates.27
The Court, however, used Parker v. Levy to lay the foundation for a
new doctrine of judicial deference to military judgment, even though it
was completely unnecessary to the result and inconsistent with
constitutional precedent and text. The opinion changed the balance of
civil-military relations by characterizing the military as not just an
institution with distinctive disciplinary requirements, but as a separate
society with a different relationship to the Constitution than civilian
society. The Court seized on language from an earlier case observing only
that the military was "a specialized community governed by a separate
discipline' '2 (the provisions of the UCMJ) and misrepresented it in Parker
v. Levy as stating that the military was "a specialized society separate from
civilian society" and "a society apart from civilian society.' '29 The
difference may seem small, but it was dramatic in effect because it was
designed to set the military apart as a constitutionally separate entity.
26. Parker, 417 U.S. at 736-37.
27. The First Amendment does not provide unlimited protection to public employees,
military, or civilian. School teachers, for example, can be dismissed from employment for speaking
on matters of public concern if their statements have "impeded the teacher's proper performance
of his daily duties in the classroom" or "interfered with the regular operation of the schools
generally." Pickering v. Bd. of Educ., 391 U.S. 563, 572-73 (1968).
28. Orloffv. Willoughby, 345 U.S. 83, 94 (1953). In Orloff, the Court upheld the Army's
discretion to choose the particular medical duties assigned to a drafted physician. The petitioner
complained that the Army assigned him to work as an enlisted laboratory technician rather than as
a commissioned physician after he refused to provide information about his association with
"subversive" organizations in his application for an officer's commission. The Court declined to
step into the middle of what it saw as an argument between the Army and one dissatisfied draftee
about whether his assigned duties were beneath his qualifications. It concluded that "judges are not
given the task of running the Army." Id. at 93.
29. Parker, 417 U.S. at 743-44.
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Parker v. Levy was the first in a new generation of case law analyzing
constitutional civil-military relations in which the military's supposed
"separateness" from civilian society justified its exemption from the usual
constitutional expectation of civilian judicial review.
The constitutional separatism between military and civilian worlds
endorsed in Parker v. Levy provided the basic framework for a doctrine of
judicial deference that would make it possible for the government to use
the military as a platform for resistance to constitutional values of
equality.3" By establishing a distant military as a "society apart" from the
rest of us, the Court would be able to hide behind professions of ignorance
of all things of a military nature:
[I]t is difficult to conceive of an area of governmental activity in
which the courts have less competence. The complex, subtle, and
professional decisions as to the composition, training, equipping,
and control of a military force are essentially professional military
judgments, subject always to civilian control of the Legislative and
Executive Branches.
3
'
Moreover, if judges were unable to understand the internal disciplinary
needs of the military, then it would make little sense to ask the military (or
Congress, when legislating on its behalf) to articulate the specific purposes
or justifications underlying its decisions. As a result, the Court discarded
its usual standards of review when evaluating the constitutionality of
decisions made in a military context. Instead of taking into account the
specific context of the military environment in measuring the reach of the
Constitution within that environment - an analysis which prevailing
standards of review would have easily accommodated -the Court instead
chose to make actual military context irrelevant. Provided the military or
Congress was willing to assert there was a military necessity for a
particular decision, the Court would not ask for factual explanation or
justification of that assertion and would not test it under the usual
constitutional standards of review. Mere assertion of military necessity
became the ultimate trump card, and the card has been played most often
as a means of resistance to constitutional values of equality.
30. For a more comprehensive discussion ofthe doctrine ofjudicial deference, see generally
Diane H. Mazur, Rehnquist's Vietnam: Constitutional Separatism and the Stealth Advance of
MartialLaw, 77 IND. L.J. 701 (2002); Diane H. Mazur, Why Progressives Lost the War When They
Lost the Draft, 32 HOFSTRA L. REv. 553 (2003).
31. Rostker v. Goldberg, 453 U.S. 57, 65-66 (1981) (emphasis added in original) (quoting
Gilligan v. Morgan, 413 U.S 1, 10 (1973)).
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Rostker v. Goldberg 2 and Goldman v. Weinberger33 are the principal
examples of how the post-Vietnam doctrine of judicial deference to the
military has changed constitutional civil-military relations. In Rostker, the
Court upheld the decision of Congress to register men, but not women, for
the military draft. Rather than following existing precedent concerning
equal protection on the basis of sex, which would have required the
rejection of any justification based on "archaic and overbroad
generalizations"34 concerning appropriate roles for women, the Court
instead embraced reasoning that excluded women from the obligation of
national defense for the very purpose of maintaining traditional gender
relationships within civilian society. Women could be excluded from the
responsibilities of citizenship, according to the Court, because "[t]he
principle that women should not intentionally and routinely engage in
combat is fundamental, and enjoys wide support among our people."'35 The
opinion made mocking reference to the idea that classifications based on
sex were deserving of enhanced judicial scrutiny,36 and it failed to question
factually incredible assertions that women would be of little use to the
military in the event of a future draft.37 Ultimately, the opinion dissolved
into platitudes, relying on protestations of incompetence in military
concerns, superficial insistence about the needs of national defense, and
the importance of "the current thinking as to the place of women in the
Armed Services."38
Goldman v. Weinberger39 followed a similar path. In that case, an Air
Force psychologist who was also an Orthodox Jew was punished for
wearing a yarmulke indoors while in uniform. In upholding the Air Force's
action, the Court noted it had "repeatedly held"4 ("repeatedly
misrepresented" would have been more accurate) that the military is a
separate society, not just an institution governed by a different criminal
code. The military's constitutional separateness left courts, according to
Goldman, "ill-equipped to determine the impact upon discipline that any
32. Id. at 57.
33. 475 U.S. 503 (1986).
34. Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 198 (1976).
35. Rostker, 453 U.S. at 77 (quoting S. REP. No. 96-826, at 157 (1980), reprinted in 1980
U.S.C.C.A.N. 2612, 2647).
36. See id. at 69 (referring, with sarcastic quotation marks, to levels of "scrutiny").
37. See id. at 97-101 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (describing personnel needs that could have
been filled by women in the event of a draft).
38. Id. at 71.
39. 475 U.S. 503 (1986).
40. Id. at 506.
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particular intrusion upon military authority might have."' As a result, it
was unnecessary for the Court to apply the prevailing standard of review,
which would have required the military to demonstrate a compelling
reason for interfering with Captain Goldman's free exercise of his
religion.42 Provided the Air Force was willing to assert its belief that
"standardized uniforms encourage[] the subordination of personal
preferences and identities in favor of the overall group mission," the Court
would accept that judgment at face value, because military officials have
"no constitutional mandate to abandon their considered professional
judgment."'43 The doctrine ofjudicial deference in military matters was the
deciding factor - the only factor - in the case. "[Jiudicial
deference . . . is at its apogee when legislative action under the
congressional authority to raise and support armies and make rules and
regulations for their governance is challenged." '44 For good measure, the
Court also suggested that Captain Goldman's claims to free exercise of his
(non-majority) religion were selfish and indicated a lack of commitment
to duty,45 a suggestion that echoes in the military's opposition to the claims
of gay servicemembers today.
There is something about the subject matter of the military that causes
the Court to wax illogical about the Constitution. Searching for a textual
justification for its creation of a doctrine of deference, the Court has
claimed it has no role in deciding constitutional issues in a military context
because Article I of the Constitution expressly assigns the power to govern
and regulate the military to Congress alone, "under an explicit
constitutional grant of authority." '46 The Court, however, seemed to forget
that Congress always acts under an explicit grant of authority under Article
I. If this principle of judicial deference is correct, then the Court should
similarly defer on a consistent basis to all exercises of congressional power
under Section 8 of Article I. This, obviously, the Court does not do. It
recognizes that judicial power exists to enforce all provisions of the
Constitution, even if a particular subject matter, such as patents and
41. Id. at 507 (quoting Chappell v. Wallace, 462 U.S. 296, 305 (1983)).
42. See Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 406-10 (1963) (holding that a compelling state
interest is required to justify substantial infringement of a person's right to free exercise of
religion).
43. Goldman, 475 U.S. at 508, 509.
44. Id. at 508 (quoting Rostker v. Goldberg, 453 U.S. 57, 70 (1986)).
45. See id. at 507 (citing the importance of "instinctive obedience, unity, commitment, and
esprit de corps" to military effectiveness). "The essence of military service 'is the subordination
of the desires and interests of the individual to the needs of the service."' Id. (quoting Orloff v.
Willoughby, 345 U.S. 83, 92 (1953)).
46. Rostker v. Goldberg, 453 U.S. 57, 70(1981).
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copyrights, for example, is mentioned expressly only in Article I, and not
in Article Il.
41
V. A PREVIEW OF HOW THE GOVERNMENT WILL DEFEND "DON'T ASK,
DON'T TELL" AFTER LAWRENCE V. TEXAS
The government's response to any constitutional challenge to "Don't
Ask, Don't Tell" following Lawrence v. Texas4" is likely to rely on the
same themes that underlie the Court's thirty-year doctrine of deference to
judgments of a military nature: 1) a constitutional distance between
military and civilian worlds that leaves civilian courts incompetent to
apply the Constitution in a military environment; 2) reliance on superficial
assertions of military necessity and avoidance of any specific discussion
of military context; and 3) the inevitable misrepresentation that has
become an indispensable part of the practice of judicial deference to the
military.
The key to the government's defense of "Don't Ask, Don't Tell" will
be to blur the distinction between considering military context when
engaging in judicial review of constitutional claims and granting the
military immunity from judicial review of constitutional claims. If the
doctrine of deference can be pierced to permit consideration of actual
military context, then Lawrence v. Texas has made it much more likely
that "Don't Ask, Don't Tell" can be successfully challenged. If, however,
the government is able to exclude consideration of actual military context,
congressional judgment will be affirmed. The irony is significant, but the
principle is undoubtedly accurate.
47. See Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (I Cranch) 137, 177 (1803) ("It is emphatically the
province and duty of the judicial department to say what the law is."). The Constitution makes only
one explicit textual distinction between rights accorded within and without the military. In the Fifth
Amendment, the Constitution exempts "cases arising in the land or naval forces, or in the Militia,
when in actual service in time of War or public danger" from the requirement for presentment or
indictment by a grand jury.
Justice Scalia has also crafted a textual justification for judicial deference to the military that
relies on tallying the number ofclauses within Article I, Section 8 that reference the military. Under
his analysis, which to my knowledge has not been applied in any other context, the fact that the
drafters of the Constitution chose to separate the military powers into five different clauses, rather
than consolidate them into fewer clauses, counsels greater judicial deference to legislative choice.
"What is distinctive here is... the insistence (evident from the number of Clauses devoted to the
subject) with which the Constitution confers authority over the Army, Navy, and militia upon the
political branches." United States v. Stanley, 483 U.S. 669, 682 (1987).
48. 123 S. Ct. 2472 (2003).
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A government brief filed in a case now pending before the U.S. Court
of Appeals for the Armed Forces (USCAAF), the highest court in the
military's Article I system of criminal justice, provides a glimpse of how
the government is likely to defend "Don't Ask, Don't Tell" after
Lawrence.49 In United States v. Marcum,5" the defendant appealed from a
court-martial conviction for consensual sodomy on the basis that his
conduct can no longer be criminalized after Lawrence. Granted, the
military's criminal prohibition of sodomy under Article 125 of the UCMJ5'
is distinguishable in many ways from "Don't Ask, Don't Tell," a policy
which makes gay people civilly ineligible for military service and requires
their administrative discharge from the military should they be discovered.
However, the grounds underlying the government's defense of Article 125
in Marcum are so similar to the grounds that are likely to be raised in
defense of "Don't Ask, Don't Tell" that the case is instructive for post-
Lawrence challenges to the policy.
In justifying the need for "Don't Ask, Don't Tell," Congress has relied
on the substantial divide of experience and understanding that has
developed between the military and civilian society. This distance,
exacerbated by the Court's doctrine of judicial deference, has allowed
Congress to justify the policy with assertions that make little sense in a
military context, but sound "military" enough to pass muster. For example,
one of the congressional findings offered in support of "Don't Ask, Don't
Tell" states that military service is a 24-hour-a-day obligation in which
"on-duty" and "off-duty" distinctions are irrelevant:
The standards of conduct for members of the armed forces regulate
a member's life for 24 hours each day beginning at the moment the
member enters military status and not ending until that person is
discharged or otherwise separated from the armed forces.
Those standards of conduct, including the Uniform Code of
Military Justice, apply to a member of the armed forces at all times
49. See Supplemental Final Brief on Behalf of Appellee, United States v. Marcum, No. 02-
0944/AF (C.A.A.F. filed Sept. 22, 2003) [hereinafter Government Brief].
50. No. 02-0944/AF (C.A.A.F. argued Oct. 7, 2003).
51. 10 U.S.C. § 925 (2004). The UCMJ sodomy provision applies to both same-sex and
opposite-sex intimacy, as did the sodomy statute at issues in Bowers v. Hardwick. Bowers v.
Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986). In Marcum, the defendant was originally charged with forcible
sodomy, but the members (the military jury) found the conduct was consensual.
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that the member has a military status, whether the member is on
base or off base, and whether the member is on duty or off duty.
5 2
These findings were intended to address the criticism that no military
justification existed for regulating personal relationships when
servicemembers were off-duty and off-base, absent undue influence. The
government's portrayal of military life in these findings, however, is
nonsensical. Obviously, the military routinely carves out zones of private
life for military families and unmarried servicemembers. Unmarried
servicemembers are allowed to date, and the military provides family
housing for married servicemembers at their permanent duty stations. The
fact that standards of conduct would prohibit a servicemember from
engaging in intimacy with a heterosexual spouse or partner when on duty
or when residing in a military facility does not mean the servicemember
cannot do so at the appropriate time and place. The military offers the "24-
hour-a-day" rationale only for the purpose of asserting that gay
servicemembers have no expectation of private life when in military
service, even though all others do. Lawrence expressly invalidates this
assumption.53
In Marcum, the government similarly had to explain why the
commission of private, consensual sodomy, in and of itself, has any
relationship to military concerns. Having absolutely no rational
explanation to offer,54 the government's brief instead misrepresented the
law. The government first quoted a portion of a congressional "finding,"
codified in 1993 as part of "Don't Ask, Don't Tell," that the presence of
gay servicemembers "creates an unacceptable risk to the high standards of
morale, good order and discipline, and unit cohesion that are the essence
of military capability."55 It then cut-and-pasted the word "sodomy" to
replace the finding's reference to gay servicemembers, deliberately
creating the false impression that Congress has tied sodomy restrictions
enacted almost a half-century earlier to military effectiveness.56 The
52. 10 U.S.C. § 654(a)(9)-(10) (2004).
53. See supra text accompanying note 16.
54. Social scientists who specialize in military issues filed an amicus brief stating that the
military's claim that sodomy undermines military discipline "is incorrect and unsupported by social
scientific data." See Brief of Social Scientists and Military Experts as Amici Curiae at 1, United
States v. Marcum, No. 02-0944/AF (C.A.A.F. filed Oct. 2, 2003). One of the experts was Dr.
Charles Moskos of Northwestern University, the most prominent military sociologist in the United
States and a principal architect of "Don't Ask, Don't Tell."
55. 10 U.S.C. § 654(a)(15) (2004).
56. See infra text accompanying note 63. The government's brief stated, "Congress has
specifically found that sodomy 'creates an unacceptable risk to the high standards of morale, good
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government's brief consistently and misleadingly equated the commission
of sodomy with the presence of gay servicemembers, clinging stubbornly
to Bowers and ignoring the clear command of Lawrence." Apparently, the
military's sodomy provision is so difficult to justify constitutionally that
its defenders see no option other than misrepresentation of the law.
The heart of the government's defense of the military's sodomy
provision in Marcum was its expectation that judicial deference to the
military would protect conclusory, unexplained assertions of military
necessity from constitutional review.5 8 The brief attempted to create
military necessity by sheer insistence, without more:
[I]t is clear that there is a rational basis for criminalizing unnatural
carnal copulation between members of the same or even the
opposite sex when that conduct is engaged in by members of the
military. The needs of good order and discipline, the needs of unit
cohesion, and the need to avoid bringing discredit on the military
give rise to a rational basis for criminalizing private consensual
sodomy.5 9
The only tenuous connection between sodomy and military discipline
offered by the government appeared in its warnings that "[p]rivate
order and discipline, and unit cohesion that are the essence of military capability."' The brief then
attempted to excuse the misrepresentation by adding: "Although these findings specifically apply
to a policy permitting administrative separation of [gay servicemembers], the findings accurately
demonstrate Congress' recognition that military needs differ from those of civilian society when
regulating otherwise private sexual conduct." Government Brief, supra note 49, at 6-7. The same
cut-and-paste misrepresentation appeared again later in the brief, without the correction afterward.
Id. at 10-11.
57. The government wrote: "Although reversing the holding in Bowers, the Court in
Lawrence did not specifically hold there is a fundamental right to engage in homosexual sodomy."
Id. at 5. This statement was a gratuitous insult toward gay servicemembers and reflective of the
degree of candor and respect with which the government treats controlling authority. Lawrence
recognized that "[t]o say that the issue in Bowers was simply the right to engage in certain sexual
conduct demeans the claim the individual put forward, just as it would demean a married couple
were it to be said marriage is simply about the right to have sexual intercourse." Lawrence v. Texas,
123 S. Ct. 2472, 2478 (2003).
58. See Government Brief, supra note 49, at 3-5, 7-12 (framing judicial deference to the
military as the central argument throughout the brief).
59. Id. at 11-12. The government mischaracterized the level ofjudicial scrutiny applied in
Lawrence as rational-basis review. When the Court speaks of "the full right" of liberty under the
Due Process Clause to engage in conduct "without intervention of the government," it is not
applying rational-basis review. See Lawrence, 123 S. Ct. at 2484. It was unnecessary to identify
the degree of enhanced scrutiny applied when Texas failed to offer any legitimate government
interest whatsoever.
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consensual sodomy between superior and subordinate is highly detrimental
to military necessity, effectiveness and discipline"60 and, in a military
environment, relationships might exist in which "consent might not be
easily refused."'" But these are concerns that relate to inappropriate sexual
relationships across-the-board, heterosexual and homosexual, and not to
any specific means of sexual intimacy. The military already prohibits
inappropriate relationships that may be subject to undue influence, such as
fraternization between those of different ranks.62 The bottom line is that
the UCMJ's sodomy statute has never been justified by the needs of
military discipline, and it is dishonest to argue, as the government does,
that it ever has been.63 The sodomy statute in fact undermines military
discipline, because it invites arbitrary and vindictive prosecution of
conduct that is commonly practiced.64
In defending "Don't Ask, Don't Tell" after Lawrence, the government
will rely on the same expectation that the doctrine ofjudicial deference in
matters relating to the military prevents courts from actually considering
military context in measuring the constitutionality of military policies.
Policies such as "Don't Ask, Don't Tell" persist not because they have any
value in maintaining discipline in a military context, but because the
doctrine of deference has completely erased military context as a relevant
factor in constitutional review. Ironically, we seem to express our respect
for military concerns by assuming they are not sufficiently persuasive to
withstand open discussion. As a result, deference has permitted - even
encouraged - military policy to be used for purposes that actually weaken
military readiness. We live with that weakened military readiness because
it is more important to Congress to use military policy as a means of
endorsing socially conservative values outside the reach of the
Constitution, particularly with respect to women and gay people.
"Don't Ask, Don't Tell" weakens military readiness for more than just
the direct and obvious reason, by requiring the discharge of talented gay
60. Government Brief, supra note 49, at 13.
61. Id. at 12 (quoting Lawrence, 123 S. Ct. at 2484).
62. See MANUAL FOR COURTS-MARTIAL, supra note 24, pt. IV, 83.
63. Some provisions of the UCMJ identify offenses that are uniquely military in nature, but
others duplicate typical common-law criminal offenses that are also punishable in civilian life. The
legislative history of the UCMJ, enacted in 1950, shows that Congress adopted the language of the
sodomy provision from the then-existing criminal code of Maryland. See United States v.
Henderson, 34 M.J. 174, 176 (C.A.A.F. 1992).
64. See NAT'L INST. OF MILITARY JUSTICE, REPORT OF THE COMMISSION ON THE 50TH
ANNIVERSARY OF THE UNIFORM CODE OF MILITARY JUSTICE 11-12 (2001), available at
http://www.nimj.com/documents/cox-commReport.pdf(last visited July 23, 2004).
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servicemembers.65 A military that defines itself in terms of a moral code
based on constitutional resistance discourages the enlistment of quality
youth, male and female, gay and straight, white and non-white, who value
constitutional equality. It sends a message that citizens who value
constitutional equality are not welcome in the military. Fortunately, I
believe this message will eventually lead to the end of "Don't Ask, Don't
Tell." The military will one day tire of its enforcement and realize the
policy is discouraging rather than encouraging enlistment, and this will
probably happen before courts are ready to pierce the doctrine of deference
and reveal there never was a military justification behind the policy. Either
way, the reality of military readiness will control, whether through
recognition by courts or the exigency of the military's own operational
needs.
VI. CONCLUSION: ARE LAW SCHOOLS COMPLICIT IN THE
CONSTITUTIONAL SEPARATISM THAT FUELS "DON'T
ASK, DON'T TELL"?
The constitutional separatism that is the central foundation ofjudicial
deference has been enormously corrosive to civil-military relations and to
civilian control of the military under the Constitution. It is a constitutional
harm, surprisingly, that legal academics have largely failed to notice. For
example, not one of the cases upholding "Don't Ask, Don't Tell" in
federal circuit courts of appeal reflects any challenge by the plaintiffs to
the constitutionality of judicial deference itself," even though just thirty
years ago - a blink in constitutional history - the Court departed from
both text and precedent in establishing the military as a constitutionally
separate entity. The creation of the military as "a separate society" that
operates outside usual constitutional limits has been so effective that law
professors now seem incapable of reading the Constitution any other way.
The doctrine ofjudicial deference to the military relies on maintenance
of a divide of experience and knowledge between the military and civilian
society for its continued vitality. Without that divide, there would be no
reason to bar courts from openly considering military context, and
65. See generally SERVICEMEMBERS LEGAL DEFENSE NETWORK, CONDUCT UNBECOMING:
THE TENTH ANNUAL REPORT ON "DON'T ASK, DON'T TELL, DON'T PURSUE, DON'T HARASS"
(2004), available at http://dont.stanford.edu/commentary/sdn. I 1.pdf (last visited Aug. 10,2004).
66. See, e.g., Able v. United States, 155 F.3d 628, 632-34 (2d Cir. 1998); Holmes v. Cal.
Army Nat'l Guard, 124 F.3d 1126, 1133 (9th Cir. 1997); Richenberg v. Perry, 97 F.3d 256, 261
(8th Cir. 1996); Thomasson v. Perry, 80 F.3d 915, 925-27 (4th Cir. 1996) (en banc); Steffan v.
Perry, 41 F.3d 677, 685-86 (D.C. Cir. 1994) (en banc).
[Vol. 15
20041 IS "DON TASK, DON'T TELL" UNCONSTITUTONAL AFTER LAWRENCE? WHAT WILL TA E 441
therefore no reason to excuse courts from applying prevailing judicial
standards to constitutional challenges raised in a military context.
Deference rises or falls on whether we see the military as apart of society
or apart from society. A separatist military is the necessary prerequisite to
a military that is permitted by law to resist shared values of constitutional
equality.
Unfortunately, law professors and law schools may be complicit in
maintaining the very separatism that permits policies like "Don't Ask,
Don't Tell" to exist. Law schools are now engaged in a controversy with
the Department of Defense concerning their ability to affirm values of
nondiscrimination by excluding employers who discriminate on the basis
of sexual orientation - including the military - from school-sponsored
career-placement programs." I understand and support the desire of law
schools and law professors to affirm values of nondiscrimination by
excluding employers who refuse to comply with the law school's
nondiscrimination policies. The military, however, is not just another
employer. The military is the only employer for which we all share a
constitutional obligation of civilian control. To the extent that we express
disagreement with military policy by limiting the military's presence in
our most influential institutions of legal reform, we contribute to an
unexamined assumption that the military is a constitutionally separate
entity, an assumption that will only extend the time before "Don't Ask,
Don't Tell" is invalidated. Shunning of the military is a counterproductive
solution when the military will be able to rely on that shunning to insulate
itself from judicial review.
67. A recent lawsuit filed by the Forum of Academic and Institutional Rights, an association
of law schools and law faculties, charges that the Solomon Amendment, which withdraws federal
funding from schools that deny access to military recruiters, is unconstitutional. See generally
Solomon Amendment Response and Protest (listing pleadings and other materials related to
Solomon Amendment litigation), available at http://www.law.georgetown.edu/solomon/ (last
visited July 23, 2004).
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